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INTRODUCTION

The literature on reparations as a remedy for past discrimination, slavery,
unjust enrichment, and endowment inequality makes it easy to understand why
citizens and politicians will hold disparate views regarding the morality and
wisdom of reparations. Large-scale reparations, such as those proposed for
African Americans who were wronged by slavery and a long history of
discrimination, appear to have little chance of political or judicial
implementation. This article sets out to design a reparations scheme that could
attract sufficient political support, despite the fact that a significant majority of
surveyed citizens presently oppose reparations. The centerpiece of the design
strategy is the unconventional idea of elective, or privatized, reparations, in
which the government, through tax rules and a willingness to enforce various
contingent promises, serves something of an enabling function. Individuals
and businesses are then encouraged to opt-in by pledging multi-year payments
or surtaxes. These reparative payments might be contingent on other citizens
making similar and coordinated pledges. The government might also promise
to give credit for private payments in the event that payments are coerced in
the future. Privatized reparations bear some resemblance to charitable giving
and some likeness to political campaign contributions, but reparations present
distinct collective action, personal morality, and institutional design issues. I
go on to consider some of these public choice issues, as it explores the thin line
between charitable endeavors and direct government programs and then also
between voluntary, private investments and successor public interventions.

* Dean & William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I am grateful
for discussions with colleagues at the University of Chicago Law School Faculty
Roundtable, and then for suggestions provided by Kevin Blackman, Ward Farnsworth, Eric
Posner, and Adrian Vermeule.
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THE RE-EMERGENCE OF REPARATIONS CLAIMS

African American reparations, associated with slavery and a long history of
discrimination, appears to be an impossibly academic topic. But, legislation
proposed some sixteen years ago for Japanese Americans interned during
World War II and the re-opening of the question of German reparations to
Holocaust survivors have generated a resurgence of interest in the subject.'
Even so, it is much easier and safer to explain why African American
reparations are different and presently absent than it is to argue for a particular
plan of reparations. 2 In previous work, I have joined others on the easier path
and emphasized the relatively large number of African American slave
descendants, the long passage of time since slavery, the dispersed character of
slave descendants or victims of racial discrimination in the last century, and the
existence of affirmative action and other programs which might be seen by
some voters and scholars as substitutes for reparations. 3 As a purely positive
matter, African American reparations are unlikely to materialize, and are
perhaps as unlikely as a renegotiation with current American Indians regarding
the purchase of Manhattan Island long ago or as a recovery from present
Southerners for the firing on Fort Sumter.4 I will not back away from those
positivist arguments here. Instead, I take this assessment as an opportunity to
ask what sort of reparations plan might have some chance of political success.
I admit to mixed motives. My aim is to show that voluntary participation may
be the stuff of political compromise, and then to see what public choice lessons
may be learned from such compromise.
Reparations is a public choice topic precisely because it is an idea, or
aspiration, that remains on some political agendas and does emerge in
legislation from time to time, 5 and that is normally - and perhaps inevitably -

I See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparationsfor Slavery and Other Historical
Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 689, 696-97 (2003).
See id. at 746-47 (explaining the relative ease of identifying and discussing problems,
both moral and practical, with reparations plans as compared to the significant difficulties in
establishing a concrete proposal).
3 See Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations,99 COLUM. L. REv. 1657,
1688-90 (1999) [hereinafter Levmore, Changes] (acknowledging the arguments weighing
against reparations for victims of slavery or historical discrimination).
4 See id. (noting the lack of majority support for African American reparations).
2

5 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the ReparationsDebate

in America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 279, 286-90 (2003) (describing the different waves
of African American reparations activism since the end of the civil war); Tuneen E.
Chisolm, Comment, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door: Examining The Argument for
Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 677, 686-87 (1999)

(reporting that "[i]n 1989 and in every session of Congress since 1993, the African
American Reparations Commissions Act... has been introduced, calling for the
establishment of a Commission to Study Reparations Proposals for African Americans" and
that "[t]o date, the bill has not gone past the Committee on the Judiciary").
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favored by a minority of voters in intense fashion. 6 Generally speaking, this
sort of intense, minority preference is satisfied through bargains with other
minorities, or interest groups, through explicit market transactions, or simply
because a well-organized group can enjoy considerable power in the political
process. 7 If, for instance, a minority favors foreign aid to Greece or Israel, it
may come into being as part of a package in which the "winners" are likely to
give up something with respect to other programs or taxes. 8 Similarly, if a

minority favors a given airport expansion, it might get its way as part of a
portfolio of transportation projects, it might simply be able to "buy" the airport

expansion on its own and pay for it through local taxes or user fees, or it might
be able to give or promise support to politicians while the costs of the plan are
imposed on dispersed interests.
Where race is concerned, a strong tradition in constitutional law suggests
that some groups may be repeatedly unsuccessful in gaining their share of
political bargains. 9 In the case of African American reparations, it is striking
both that such reparations are strongly favored only by a substantial majority
of African Americans 10 and that while affirmative action (which might be seen
6 See Ogletree, supra note 5, at 286-90 (discussing the intense minorities that have

actively favored African American reparations in the past); see also infra note 10 (reporting
survey data indicating that African American reparations are currently favored by a minority
of, mostly African American, voters).
7 The matter is likely to stay in focus because of the well-known advantages that intense
and well organized minorities can wield in the political process. See Levmore, Changes,
supra note 3, at 1688 (noting that "public choice theory suggests that a small organized
minority will often fare better than a dispersed one of equal size - or even of much greater
size") (citing MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971)). If tobacco
farmers and other groups can obtain billions of dollars in benefits because they have
qualities that permit political overachievement, then we might expect some reparations plans
to succeed in similar fashion. Cf id. at 1688 (noting that Japanese American reparations
may reflect the power of small organized minorities to achieve their goals).
I See id. at 1665-66 (positing one view of political compromise that states that where
minorities, or losers, "have sufficient power to delay or block desirable change, winners...
find it worthwhile to compensate losers in order to go forward...").
9 See RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 237-39
(bemoaning the belief that, regardless of African American votes, "those who exercise
control over our national public policy see no reason why they should care very much about
taking steps to fix what America has done to blacks").
10 One survey suggests that 32% of White Americans think they should make up for past
and present discrimination, 38% think the federal government should apologize for slavery,
and 19% think the federal government should make payments to those whose ancestors
were slaves, though only 11% gave an affirmative response when this was put in terms of
reparations to descendants of slaves. The rate of affirmative responses from Blacks was
significantly higher with, for example, 64% agreeing that White Americans have benefited
from past and present discrimination against African Americans, and should be willing to
make up for these past wrongs. Karlyn Bowman, Reparations? White and Black Attitudes
towards Reparations for Slavery, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, July 2001, available at
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as something of a substitute for reparations, II though it will be useful to sidestep that question here) has become part of many political bargains, 12 it often
burdens disparate, unidentifiable, and politically weak persons - at least as
13
compared to any imaginable reparations plan.
It is with all this in mind that this article begins with the question of what
sort of reparations plan would have the best chance of success. This question
is peppered with ambiguity. The term "best" means better or as good as any
other, and not more-likely-than-not.
I have already suggested that no
reparations plan is likely. 14 "Reparations" itself is an ill-defined term, and,
indeed, much of what I sketch in this article could be criticized as
15
insufficiently reparative because it is forward rather than backward looking.
This criticism, it should be noted, implies that affirmative action is not
reparative, and many observers will not want to subscribe entirely to that
view. 16 Finally, "success" is also an elusive concept, and much too easily
asserted. I will take it to mean not only the passage of some sort of legislation,
but also the participation of enough people, both as beneficiaries and as bearers
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m2185/is_5 12/ai_76488234. In another survey,
30% of Whites favored an apology and only 4% favored monetary reparations, while 79%
of Blacks favored a formal apology and 67% were for monetary reparations. The same
respondents were asked about reparations for Japanese American internees, though at the
time such reparations had already been legislated and publicized; 43% of the Whites favored
an apology, with 26% in favor of payments. Black respondents were much more positive;
75% for apology and 59% for payments. Harbour Fraser Hodder, Riven by Reparations: The
Price of Slavery, HARV. MAG. May-June 2003 (reporting on work by Michael Dawson and
Rovana Popoff), available at http://www.harvardmagazine.com/on-line/050319.html.
Finally, another survey that looked for a racial comparison found that the breakdown for
money reparations was 6% (White respondents) to 55% (Black respondents). Reparations
in Black and White, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 18, 2002, at J6 (reporting on a CNNUSA Today Gallup poll).
" See Levmore, Changes, supra note 3, at 1688-89 (noting the possibility that many
people do not support reparations because "[a]ffirmative action or other programs might be
understood as substitutes for monetary reparations"); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at
727-29 (discussing the possible role for affirmative action in future reparations schemes).
12 Chisolm, supra note 5, at 683-84 (stating that in recent years support for reparations
has been fueled by efforts to dismantle affirmative action).
" See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 729 ("[T]he costs of affirmative action fall
upon a largely national group - marginal nonpreferred candidates, who may often not know
whether the preference was dispositive in denying them relevant goods or opportunities, and
who are unlikely to be able to organize for effective political action. Under a cash
reparations scheme, by contrast, the recipients of the benefit are easy to identify ... .
14 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (mentioning the difficulties, both practical
and political, involved in shaping an effective African American reparations plan).
15 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 690 (defining "reparations" as backward
looking).
16 See id. at 727 (asserting that "[tihe leading mode of in-kind reparative payment, at
least in the United States, is remedial affirmative action").
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of the burdens, that a significant portion of the population is satisfied (at the
very least) that a sincere apology has been given.1 7 Success might also be
measured by closure. 18 If after the enactment of plan X, no serious reparations
claim arises for a generation or more, we might conclude that X was
successful.
Following the introduction of a plausible reparations plan, I will turn to the
more academic question of what we learn from the exercise. One lesson is that
the line between government spending and philanthropic endeavors is a thin
one. Another is that collective action problems permeate not only democratic
decisions, but also commitments to charities, apologies, and virtually
everything associated with past and imagined reparations. This article takes
the first step in a larger project which aims to understand how private
preferences, embedded in the stuff of free enterprise and individual liberty,
easily evolve into government programs and mandates.
The academic literature on reparations for African Americans is wideranging, but largely as skeptical as I have been thus far. 19 It thus reflects
popular sentiment and media coverage, which focus on the seemingly
insurmountable questions of who would pay and who would receive reparative
payments, and of what magnitude.20 Despite the skepticism and difficulties,
there has been excellent work on the potential for reparations as a remedy for
past discrimination, slavery, and unjust enrichment. 2' The richness of this
work makes it easy to understand why citizens and politicians hold disparate

7 See Ogletree, supra note 5, at 306 (asserting that "prospective injunctive relief such as
a government apology and acknowledgment of its racist practices... may be more
important than monetary relief in promoting the.., goal of racial reconciliation").
18 See Levmore, Changes, supra note 3, at 1693 (arguing the possibility that "the
majority declines to make [reparations] payments early because there is no guarantee that
the victims will treat the payments as final"); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 744-46
(highlighting the importance of finality in developing and analyzing reparations proposals).
19 See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1 (analyzing the difficulties and skepticism
associated with the debate for African American reparations); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial
Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REv.
477, 502-23 (1998) (supporting African American claims to reparations, but expressing
doubts as to the ultimate success of any judicial or legislative schemes).
20 See, e.g., David L. Chappell, If Affirmative Action Fails... What Then?, N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 2004, at B7 (asserting that "politically, reparations are a pipedream"); Kurt
Schmoke, Editorial, The Problem with Payback, WASH. POST, August 28, 2001, at A15
(acknowledging the disparate conceptions of reparations).
21 See generally Ogletree, supra note 5 (defending the reparations cause); Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 1 (providing an overview of the legal, moral, and conceptual issues
surrounding reparations and introducing analytical tools for further reparations debate); see
also ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 201-34 (discussing the need for restitution for African
Americans harmed by slavery and the long history of discrimination in the United States);
RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 119-47 (2000) (discussing reparations programs and

the various viewpoints both in favor of and against implementing such programs).
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views regarding the morality and wisdom of reparations. 22 I will assume some
familiarity with this literature, as well as an appreciation of the issues raised by
the prospect of African American reparations, as I endeavor to design what I
will call "privatized reparations" for African Americans. Much of the
discussion bears on other applications, but the following exercise is most
relevant to large-scale settings where millions of voters or members of a class
might be asked to finance reparative payments to thousands or even millions of
victims or putative beneficiaries 23 - and where, once again, a straightforward
proposal for reparations to be paid by a government largely responsible for
24
past wrongs is politically doomed.
II.

BACKWARD AND FORWARD-LOOKING, ELECTIVE REPARATIONS

It is easy, and perhaps too easy, to dismiss the prospect of large-scale
African American reparations as absurd or as simply so unlikely as not to be
worth exploring. But imagine a proposal for relatively modest reparations to be
accompanied by a public apology and to be paid by volunteers to two distinct
groups. The first part of the plan is to pay $20,000 to each living African
American veteran who served in the Armed Services of the United States
between 1939 and 1945.25 Second, the plan will pay the same amount to a
very different group; African American high school graduates in the year the
plan is first enacted and sufficiently funded, and then to a new class of
graduates each year thereafter until a set of trustees decides that there are
insufficient funds or reasons to continue. 26 These payments will come from a
22 See, e.g., Schmoke, supra note 20 (asserting that "the term 'reparations' means many
things to many people").
23 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 696-97 (listing previously implemented
large-scale reparations programs).
24 See, e.g., Levmore, Changes, supra note 3, at 1688-90 (assessing publicly funded

reparations to be politically impossible); Chappell, supra note 20 (asserting the political and
practical impossibility of African American reparations).
25 The $20,000 figure matches that offered in the Japanese American reparations
program of 1988. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 696. It is also a convenient
amount for the second prong of the plan sketched here. See infra note 26.
26 The $20,000 amount is sufficient to pay an average college tuition. The average
published tuition at public universities exceeds $4,000 per year, though the average tuition
paid (taking grants, tax breaks, scholarships, and the like into account) was less than $3,000.

The average tuition paid at private universities was about $10,000, with about one-quarter of
enrolled students attending private rather than public colleges. NATIONAL CENTER FOR
EDUCATION
BETWEEN

STATISTICS,
1990

AND

SPECIAL ANALYSIS 2004 2000

FOR

FULL

TIME,

PAYING FOR COLLEGE:

DEPENDANT

CHANGES

UNDERGRADUATES,

http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2004/analysis/sa_table.asp?tablelD=7

at

(last accessed Oct. 1,

2004). This cost may be covered by a doubling of the reparations amount used in the text,
though, of course, room and board for those who attend college away from home adds
considerably (and more, proportionally, than it did a generation ago) to these costs. Even
the $20,000 payment would surely make college affordable for the great majority of African
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Reparations Fund that will, through its well-chosen trustees, seek support from

contributors. 27 Many citizens will be much more likely to make a contribution
if millions of other citizens do so, and the plan is far more likely to promote
improved race relations if participation is broad and deep. The Fund will thus
do well to provide information about participation and to take steps to
encourage a large group of volunteers. An apology, whether moved in
Congress or developed by another group, is an important part of the plan,
though it must be accompanied by significant payments to individuals28 or
organizations, or it will suffer from the perception that talk is all too cheap.
The first beneficiary group draws its strength from the success and example
of reparations to Japanese American internees. This reparative program, and
recent precedent, puts opponents of African American reparations on the
defensive. 29 The African American slavery experience long predates Japanese

American internment camps, but, of all the discrimination suffered by African
Americans, it may be symbolically and functionally useful to single out the

startling discrimination suffered by African Americans who volunteered for (or

were later inducted into) the Armed Services between 1939 and 1945.30

Although opportunities for service and advancement in the military improved
as the war waged on, 31 well-documented and serious discrimination existed
during most of the war. 32 In fact, the policy of racial segregation in the
Americans.
27 The Reparations Fund trustees might make suggestions in the form of flat amounts or
surtaxes, but the precise amount of these pledges may be less important for the overall
emotional and political impact of the plan than the rate of participation or the fact that the
plan takes effect at all.
28 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 731 ("[A]n apology without transfer may be
criticized as 'cheap talk' for which the government will gain no moral or legal credit.");
Yamamoto, supra note 19, at 517-18 (expressing the feelings of many Japanese Americans
that "although monetary payments 'could not begin to compensate.., for [their] ... lost
freedom, property, livelihood, or the stigma of disloyalty,' the reparations demonstrated the
sincerity of the government's apology") (quoting NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A
SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION 107 (1991)).
29 See Chisolm, supra note 5, at 716 (asserting that the Civil Liberties Act granting
Japanese Americans reparations "established a precedent for legislative compensation to a
particular racial group that suffered unique injuries due to racially motivated law
enforcement" and that "based on a comparison of the 'victims' experiences, it is difficult to
fathom a reasonable justification for not enacting the African American Reparations Bill").
30 See F. Michael Higginbotham, Soldiersfor Justice: The Role of the Tuskegee Airmen
in the Desegregationof the American Armed Forces, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 273, 27990 (2000) (discussing the discrimination and segregation that faced African Americans in
the armed forces during World War II).
31 See id. at 283 (acknowledging that by 1944 the opportunities for African Americans to
serve in combat increased somewhat from the extremely limited opportunities presented
African Americans before the war).
32 See id. at 279-90 (commenting that the military deliberately assigned the majority of
black soldiers to "road building, stevedoring, laundering, and fumigating").
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military was not officially brought to an end until 1948. 33 War experience
played a role in determining post-war employment opportunities (and social
status) for many Americans, but African Americans were largely denied the
ability to develop distinguished service records. There are, of course, many
African Americans who worked in factories during the war, and who
contributed enormously to the war effort in the face of discrimination. These
persons will not collect from the Fund. On the over-inclusive side, there will
be African Americans in the veterans' beneficiary group who did advance in
the military and whose overall experience was more like their white
counterparts. On the other hand, there is something fitting about reaching back
in time, in part because Japanese Americans who were interned during that
same period have now received some reparations and an apology.34 Both
groups are aged and shrinking rapidly and, as we will see, reparations are often
most fitting and most acceptable when time is of the essence and when, more
cynically and practically, the beneficiary group will be unlikely to return some
years later and ask for greater payments. The number of persons in this group35
is presently about 200,000, but it is, again, a quickly declining population.
The goal of the present proposal is to give each member of this group $20,000,
not because the wrongs they suffered are assessed at this particular amount or
are considered equal to those suffered by Japanese American internees, but

33 President Truman officially desegregated the armed forces on July 26, 1948. Exec.
Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948); see also Higginbotham, supra note 30,

at 316.
34 The simple language of the statute authorizing reparations to Japanese Americans is
instructive.
The purposes of this Act are to (1) acknowledge the fundamental injustice of the evacuation, relocation, and
internment of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese
ancestry during World War II;
(2) apologize on behalf of the people of the United States for the evacuation,
relocation, and internment of such citizens and permanent resident aliens;
(3) provide for a public education fund to finance efforts to inform the public about
the internment of such individuals so as to prevent the recurrence of any similar
event;
(4) make restitution to those individuals of Japanese ancestry who were interned;
(5) [deals with payments to Aleuts and is not reproduced here];
(6) discourage the occurrence of similar injustices and violations of civil liberties in

the future; and
(7) make more credible and sincere any declaration of concern by the United States
over violations of human rights committed by other nations.
50 U.S.C. § 1989 (2000).
35 African Americans are estimated to constitute approximately 5% of the living veteran
population. See Department of Veterans Affairs, VA Fact Sheet: World War II Veterans by
the Numbers (2004), at http://wwwl.va.gov/pspao/docsWWIIvetsfactsheet.doc. The death
rate of World War II veterans is estimated to be 50 per day (the median age of all veterans
of that war was 80.1 in 2003). See id.

HeinOnline -- 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1298 2004

20041

REPARATIONS SYMPOSIUM: SAUL LEVMORE

1299

rather because, given the impossibility of setting a price on these wrongs, the
amount given once to a different set of survivors now seems symbolically
valuable.
Standing on its own as the object of a reparations proposal, this first group
affects too few African Americans and refers to too short a period in a long
history of slavery and discrimination to offer finality and, therefore, any
chance of political acceptance and success. This group also raises the obvious
question of why one set of wrongs should be addressed, while others are not.
An honest response to both these objections is that no plan that tries to make
payments to all who suffered will succeed, for the discrimination was horribly
and widely injurious for so long a period. 36 Another reaction is that, of all the
easily identifiable beneficiary groups, this veterans' group offers the advantage
of most closely matching Japanese American internees in terms of finality and
size. But these answers are a bit thin without the inclusion of a second,
forward-looking group of beneficiaries. This second group may not be unique
in its connection to slavery or past discrimination, but it is a useful component
to a plan that aims to heal old wounds and possibly even bring an end to other
race-based programs.
The second beneficiary group is of uncertain size because the duration of the
plan depends on its funding level, which, in turn, depends on contributors.
While the trustees may specify a date of dissolution and designate
organizations that stand ready to receive contributions after that date, it is the
donors who will effectively decide when the plan has run its course. 37 This is
one important sense in which these reparations are privatized.
Dissolution may also come about because of developments in affirmative

36 See id. at 740 (admitting the difficulty in identifying would be beneficiaries of slave

and historical discrimination reparations payments); Yamamoto, supra note 19, at 491
(describing the difficulty in identifying victims of slavery and past discrimination as a major
obstacle to the success of African American reparations lawsuits). The problem is thus one
of cost as well as identification. Payments based on evidence of the denial of employment
or college admission because of race, for example, is very difficult because so many African
Americans did not apply to schools or for jobs, given the knowledge that they would be
denied because of their race.
37 Indeed, borrowing from the "stakeholder" idea fashioned by Bruce Ackerman and Ann
Alstott, legislation could provide that anyone who receives a reparations payment of this
kind owes it back to the Fund - or to the designated organizations - at his or her death, as a
first claim on the beneficiary's estate.
BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANN ALSTOTT, THE
STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 82-83 (1999) (suggesting a substantial payment, or stake, to every

one who comes of age and advancing the scheme with the idea that the estate of a
stakeholder would, if funds were available, be required to repay the amount once received,
plus interest, to a stakeholder fund). This idea is rather unimportant if the Fund lasts but ten
or twenty years, because few beneficiaries will die before that time. It is, however, a
reasonable way of encouraging beneficiaries, as well as other citizens, to make voluntary
provisions in their wills, see id. at 82-84, but it is distracting in that it makes the reparations
into more of a loan.
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action or other law. Reparations might be seen in some quarters as a substitute
for affirmative action, or, in others, as an important accompaniment to that
practice, sufficiently powerful that the two working together will allow both
programs to reach a successful conclusion after one or two decades. 38 It is
Genuine
possible that more certainty would generate more support.
enthusiasm might accompany a reparations plan that promised an end to
affirmative action on a given date, though it is hard to see exactly how such a
promise about private programs could be made. But one group's enthusiasm
would be another's criticism, as a promise about ending affirmative action
would diminish the quality of an apology. Many beneficiaries and some
contributors should be expected to object if a reparations plan were instituted
as an explicit substitute for affirmative action. The idea advanced here
recognizes that either substitution or complementarity is possible, but that this
is largely in the hands of future donors.
It is easier to criticize this plan than to extol its virtues, but I will begin by
describing some of its features and then expand on my claim that this proposal
is the sort of reparations plan that could succeed. The amount of money at
stake is modest, by the standards of reparations, 39 or large-scale welfare
programs. The veterans' group might contain 150,000 (or more) people at the
start of a reparations program, 40 and it therefore requires $3 billion of the Fund
in order to finance a $20,000 benefit. If some years pass before a reparations
plan is underway, the number will be much lower.41 The second group
consists of some 333,000 African American high school graduates in a given
42
year, of which about 194,000 will go to a two-year or four-year college.
College attendance is, of course, not a requirement of beneficiaries; many
graduates will enter the civilian workforce or the armed services, and some
will engage in family matters or be unemployed. One could modify the plan to
make it a college scholarship plan, but this might cause more resentment than
38 See ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 8 (arguing that although affirmative action should

continue, alone it does "little for the millions of African Americans bottom-mired in urban
hells by the savage time-release social debilitations of American slavery" or "for those
Americans, disproportionately black, who inherit grinding poverty, poor nutrition, bad
schools, unsafe neighborhoods, low expectation, and overburdened mothers"); Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 1, at 745 (acknowledging the possibility of a reparations plan in
conjunction with a redesigned form of affirmative action).
39 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 696-97 (detailing other national and
international large-scale reparations payments).
40 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the size of the relevant veterans'
group).
41 See id. (projecting the death rate of the members of the veterans' group).
42 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS: TABLE 1. LABOR FORCE STATUS OF 2003 HIGH
SCHOOL GRADUATES AND 2002-2003 HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUTS 16-24 YEARS OLD BY SCHOOL
ENROLLMENT,

SEX,

RACE,

AND

1 (October 2003),
These numbers will likely not differ

HISPANIC OR LATINO ETHNICITY

http://www.bls.gov/news.release/hsgectO 1.htm.
dramatically over a several-year period.
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success. In fact, it might be seen as intending to favor colleges rather than
persons related to, and affected by the experiences of, those seen as most
deserving of reparations but now unavailable or unidentifiable.
In passing, note that about 88,000 African American high-school students
drop out of school every year. 43 These people will not receive the benefit
described here. This group may shrink in favor of increased high school
completion, as potential beneficiaries hope to claim the promised share of
reparations. Indeed, there is the modest danger of collusion between students,
teachers, and schools, because graduation will take on greater value with the
reparations plan in place. There is, however, no incentive for high school
students to delay their graduation in order to receive payments and the hazards
generated by the offer of payment are surely small compared to the potential
benefit from encouraging young people to continue with their education, at
least through high school.
To be sure, colleges may benefit from the Fund, because they may choose to
reduce financial aid awards to admitted students who are known to arrive with
reparations.
On the other hand, colleges will continue to compete for
applicants, and for minority applicants at that, and there may be upward
pressure on these awards (much as upper middle class minority applicants to
colleges now enjoy relatively generous financial aid awards, at least compared
to their predecessors). It may also be possible that colleges will be able to give
larger financial aid awards to non-African American students. Finally,
governments may choose to give more or less support to college students or to
institutions of higher education if this plan takes effect. These are but some of
the unintended, or uncertain, consequences of the plan. None of them,
however, does damage to the idea of privatized reparations.
At a benefit level of $20,000, the second group requires something on the
order of $6.7 billion each year, which is much less than the annual federal
expenditure on Pell grants. 44 After ten or twenty years, the total expenditure of
the plan might be $50 to $135 billion, or possibly even more if the trustees
raise the benefit. By way of comparison, the federal government spent about
$57 billion in 2003 alone on education and about the same on veterans'
assistance. 45 Another way to think about the relative scale of the plan is that
41 Id. The dropout figure may be an underestimate because data are developed on the
basis of individual reporting and household members may be confused about high school
See JAY P. GREEN, HIGH
SCHOOL GRADUATION RATES IN THE UNITED STATES (Nov. 2001, rev. Apr. 2002), at
diplomas and Graduate Equivalency Diplomas, for example.
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/cr-baeo.pdf
information in census forms).

(discussing the collection of dropout

44 JACQUELINE E. KING, 2003 STATUS REPORT ON THE PELL GRANT PROGRAM 27-28

(2003) (reporting the details of a program providing need-based grant assistance, and
serving one in four undergraduates with 2002 expenditures of $11.3 billion, a maximum
grant
of
$4,000,
and
an
average
grant
of
$2,415),
at
http://www.acenet.edu/bookstore/pdf/2003-pell-grant.pdf.
41 See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 2005:
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the federal government annually spends about $20,000 per household. 46 Under
the plan set forth here, more than 400,000 households would receive $20,000
in the first year of the plan, and somewhat fewer than 400,000 a year thereafter
- in addition to whatever these households receive under other programs. Over
a ten or twenty year period, including the one-time payment to veterans, more
than half of all African American households will likely receive some
reparative payment. This fraction depends on how long the plan stays in force,
which is mostly in the hands of volunteer donors, with some help from the
trustees and Congress. Finally, the annual payments required at the outset,
including the money for the veterans' benefit, amount to something less than
5% of current charitable giving, 47 and the total cost would require a tax rate
48
increase of less than 1% were the plan to be compulsory.
The money is, of course, significant, and likely enough to erase any claim
that an apology is cheap talk, but it is neither devastating nor economically
disruptive. The question for voters and donors is not so much whether it is
affordable as whether it is a good idea that will produce healing and a forwardlooking citizenry.
I have chosen these two groups of beneficiaries to illustrate several features
of reparations, and not because I think it impossible to succeed either with
transfers to organizations rather than to individuals or with different
beneficiary groups. The important quality is that the beneficiaries not be so
numerous as to doom the plan as too expensive, nor so limited as to make it
inconceivable that the plan will attract political support, promote better race
relations, and decrease rather than raise calls for further reparative payments in
the future. This last feature reflects the notion that a successful plan will offer
finality, or at least will have the potential to do so.
The novelty of the plan examined here has less to do with these beneficiary
groups (and indeed, I have suggested that payments could be channeled
through organizations rather than directly to individuals) than it does with the
source of these considerable funds. The plan is to ask for donors. It is to
suggest to donors that, as with so many other things undertaken in this country,
76 (2003) (listing government expenditures by department and agency),
available at http://,ww.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/pdf/hist.pdf.
46 BRIAN M. RIEDL, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, $20,000 PER HOUSEHOLD: THE HIGHEST
LEVEL OF FEDERAL SPENDING SINCE WORLD WAR 11 (2003) (detailing the growth in national
spending), at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Budget/BG 1710.cfm.
47Individual charitable contributions totaled $179 billion in 2003. See Rachel Emma
Silverman, CharitableGiving Increased Last Year, Rising Nearly 3%, WALL ST. J., June 21,
2004, at B6.
48Federal individual income taxes (excluding Social Insurance and Retirement Receipts)
HISTORICAL TABLES

totaled $794 billion in 2003. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES 2005: HISTORICAL TABLES § 2, at 30 (showing yearly tax receipts by

source), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ombbudget/fy2005/pdf/hist.pdf. An increase of $6.9
billion ($6.6 billion for graduates and $.3 billion for veterans over ten years) is
approximately a 0.3% tax hike for individuals if funded through increased individual taxes.
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individual and corporate volunteers can, in the aggregate, accomplish
important objectives that might fail or be done less effectively if entirely public
in nature. The public fisc would encourage contributions by offering a 50%
tax credit, and it would also promise a full tax credit for past payments in the
event that reparations were one day legislated or adjudicated in a way that
makes payments mandatory. An advantage of the matching scheme is that the
life of the payments to high school graduates would be determined by the
enthusiasm and decision-making of individual donors, much as many other
activities and entities are governed effectively by their ability to raise private
contributions. The government allows tax revenues to follow private decisions
in its support of hospitals, universities, religious organizations, and much
else. 49 In a similar fashion, reparations could effectively be privatized. I
envisage a set of eminent trustees who would not only manage the fund in
order to make orderly payments, but who would also be empowered to dissolve
the Fund when they saw fit and be in a position to return payments and forgive
pledges if the Fund attracts insufficient resources to make possible even the
projected reparations to the first beneficiary group.
III.

INDIVIDUAL DECISIONMAKERS AND RECIPIENTS

Reparations schemes - by which must be meant something more than
settlements paid in the shadow of litigation that has a good chance of success
for plaintiffs - are, to be sure, fairly unusual. 50 They have either followed wars
or (generally perceived) wrongs quite closely in time, or they have taken the
form of payments to identifiable victims at a point when no plausible claim for
additional recovery would likely arise in the future. 51 The first category

" See Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 387, 404-08 (1998)

(indicating that the government supports various organizations through charitable
deductions by "matching" individual contribution through tax "reimbursement").
50 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 696-98 (charting past reparations payments).
The U.S. government has paid claims both to groups and individuals in reparations for past
actions. See id. For example, in 1946, the U.S. paid approximately $800 million to Native
American tribes for land that had been taken without proper purchase; in 1998, the U.S. paid
approximately $1.65 billion ($20,000 each) directly to Japanese Americans interned during

World War II; and, in 1997, the U.S. apologized for and paid approximately $9 million to
African Americans who were denied treatment for syphilis as part of a governmentsponsored experiment begun in the 1930's. See id. Other experiences are catalogued in
Chisolm, supra note 5, at 713-17.
SI This is not a description or categorization that I used in previous work on reparations,
see generally Levmore, Changes, supra note 3, at 1686-1700, but it now seems to me to be
accurate and so I introduce it here. It suggests that the most notable feature about the timing
of reparations to Japanese American internees, for example, was not that the victims were
old and therefore available to politicians for only a short period of time, but rather that their
age meant that it would be unlikely that, following substantial payments, a new claim would
one day be advanced for further reparative payments. Payments are more likely when those
who must pay are convinced that the payments will offer some finality. See id. at 1693
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includes post-war payments by Germany to organizations, Holocaust
survivors, and Israel. 52 The second category is best illustrated by reparations
to some 80,000 aging survivors of Japanese American internment camps.5 3 In
contrast, African American slavery is now sufficiently behind us, which leaves
millions of indirect victims, but none of the original wounded, so to speak.
Moreover, there are so many indirect victims that it would be difficult to
identify a uniquely deserving, manifest class of beneficiaries, which indicates
54
that reparations on this basis will likely never succeed.
Reparations claims on behalf of those who suffered from overt racial
discrimination in employment or education may seem less far-fetched to the
majority, 55 but these claims also suffer from imprecision with respect to
beneficiaries. This imprecision has bearing on the very likelihood of a
reparations plan because an obvious objection to any given plan is that it fails
to pay deserving persons or that it pays undeserving persons. 56 Under(commenting on the importance of finality in reparations schemes).
52 See Kurt Scherwin, German Compensationfor Victims of Nazi Persecution, 67 Nw. U.

L. REv. 479, 514-18 (1972) (describing payments totaling more than 100 billion
Deutschemarks); see also DEP'T OF STATE, GERMAN COMPENSATION FOR NATIONAL
SOCIALIST CRIMES (describing the scope of reparations claims begun in 1953, and payments
of more than 72 billion Deutschemarks), at http://www.ushmm.org/assets/frg.htm (last
accessed Sept. 6, 2004).
13 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 696 (listing the facts of the Japanese
American reparation plan); Chisolm, supra note 5, at 713-15 (discussing the reparation
payments to Japanese Americans subjected to forced internment during World War II)
51 See Ogletree, supra note 5, at 313 (conceding the difficulty in determining individual
harm and in finding a coherent unit of beneficiaries for slave reparation payments).
Reparations tied to slavery would gain political support because of the greater likelihood of
finality. See Levmore, Changes, supra note 3, at 1693 (asserting the political necessity of
finality in any reparations claim). In contrast, reparations linked to past discrimination
would open the door for claims of similar treatment for victims of other forms or periods of
discrimination. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 746 (acknowledging the criticism
that granting one group reparations may cause other groups to make similar claims). The
problem, of course, is that the best we can do now is find distant relatives of slaves. See
Yamamoto, supra note 19, at 491. A separate problem is that those asked to pay for
reparations will feel further removed from slavery than they do from much of the history of
discrimination. See id. (describing one argument against reparations as the fact that "white
Americans living today have not injured African Americans and should not be required to
pay for the sins of their slave master forbearers" (internal citations omitted)).
" I introduce the idea of the majority here by way of recognizing that reparations plans
require political approval. The discussion below is focused on this need to bring about a
political coalition, rather than to construct a plan that is simply morally attractive, or
satisfying to those who have been wronged.
56 The objection is both moral and political, though it is the latter that interests me most
here. Imprecision makes reparations less attractive in part because it reflects a failure to get
the moral question right and in part because it makes it more likely that the reparations plan
will not provide finality, a feature that (I have already suggested) is important for political
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inclusive and over-inclusive rules (and thus outcomes) are the stuff of law, but
every deviation from an ideal adds weight to criticism of the rules or methods
by which the ideal is pursued. Substantial deviations would appear to doom
something as controversial as African American reparations.
The most obvious antidote to imprecision is to have reparations payments go
to organizations rather than to individuals.5 7 If reparations were paid to
existing and historically black institutions, including museums dedicated to the
African American experience, the imprecision criticism would be muted and
there might be some tangible educational and political benefits. A good
thought experiment is to imagine that somehow Congress approves a large
reparations fund and the primary question is whether to pay this out to
individuals or to organizations. Reasonable people will disagree as to which
distribution plan is superior. If the problem is put earlier in time, as it is here,
so that one must also ask which distribution plan is more likely to elicit such
funds from Congress in the first place, then the answer is almost surely the
organizational, rather than the individual, route, if only because organizations
will better overcome collective action problems in order to exert influence on
the legislature and secure passage of the plan.
In fact, most large-scale reparations plans, including German payments
following World War II and U.S. payments to American Indians in 1946,58
provided for payments to intermediaries, namely the State of Israel and Indian
tribes. 59 Intermediating groups, and especially the likelihood that such groups
will take part in a legislated program, do, of course, generate rent-seeking
costs, 60 and there is a political cost associated with the likelihood that some
organizations will inevitably spend resources in ways that displease voters.
In the case of reparations for American Indians, an ingenious or coincidental
advantage of channeling all payments to tribes (and clans) was that the tribes
"solved" the problem of separating deserving beneficiaries from pretenders. 61

success. See Levmore, Changes, supra note 3, at 1693; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1,
at 744-45.
17 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 739-40 (discussing the possibility and
benefits, mostly in reducing the imprecision of beneficiaries, of reparations payments to
African American organizations); see also ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 244-46 (arguing for
reparation payments to a trust fund established to benefit all African Americans).
58 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 696-98. I will consider these reparations,
though they might be thought of as settlements in the shadow of possible litigation.
19 See id. at 696-98.
60 See Levmore, Changes, supra note 3, at 1698 (positing that "the possibility of
reparative payments will bring forth rent-seeking by groups interested in obtaining
payments, and that these lobbying, litigating, and fundraising efforts can be thought of as
wasteful").
61 See id. at 1694 (comparing stated reasons for limiting payments to tribes with political
choice explanations). The novel argument hinted at in the text here is that in all cases of
ethnic or racial reparations, there will be the difficult problem of persons claiming
membership in a group where a claim may be wrong, opportunistic, or impossible to

HeinOnline -- 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1305 2004

1306

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1291

No government would wish to be in the politically incorrect, and perhaps
impossible, position of ruling on racial or ethnic eligibility, and in this case the
government effectively passed that problem on to the tribes. 62 In other
contexts, there are notorious problems associated with benefits that accrue to
tribes, 63 so that the problem of identifying genuine tribes can in theory be just
as bad as that of identifying individuals, with tribes then also in the business of
identifying their true members. 64
Where African American reparations are concerned, it is probably the case
that the very significant problem of identifying beneficiaries, or even stating
what qualities or history make for qualification, 65 could be avoided by
channeling all reparations to organizations that are historically identified with
African Americans.
This is probably the best argument for using

organizations, and, consequently, for modifying the plan offered in the present
article. Organizations do, however, bring on significant rent-seeking and
agency problems. Moreover, the problem of identifying African American
beneficiaries is no worse for a reparations plan than it is for an affirmative
action program, and inasmuch as some voters and contributors will favor a
reparations plan because they think it will reduce pressure on affirmative
action, I hesitate to tilt the balance in favor of (or against) reparations simply
by deploying organizations.
Nevertheless, I will continue to advance the idea of reparations to
individuals and not to organizations, though organizations will play a small
role in receiving contributions after the reparations plan itself comes to an
end. 66 I do this, in part, to emphasize the "privatized" and novel aspect of the

evaluate accurately (perhaps even by the claimant). The government might like a scheme
that takes the decision-making out of its hands and puts it in the hands of another entity, for
such removal will deflect criticism. If the beneficiaries are pre-existing organizations, such
as tribes, the problem is virtually eliminated, and the question becomes one of how the
tribes will spend the money they receive. Again, criticism will be deflected.
62 See JEFF BENEDICT,

WITHOUT RESERVATION:

THE MAKING OF AMERICA'S MOST

POWERFUL INDIAN TRIBE AND FOXWOODS, THE WORLD'S LARGEST CASINO 143-44 (detailing
the events in which the government abandoned their efforts to obtain proper documentation
of the legitimacy of the Pequot tribe before paying reparations to a trust fund to finance the
tribe's property acquisitions).
63 See id. at 144-50 (illustrating the difficulties involved in determining the legitimacy of
alleged tribe members and in evaluating their eligibility for reparative payments)..
64 See id.
65 See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 740 (discussing the difficulty in
assessing those harmed by slavery and historical discriminatory practices); Yamamoto,
supra note 19, at 491 (acknowledging that opponents to African American reparations often
argue the imprecision of identifying legitimate beneficiaries).
66 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (explaining that the trustees will distribute
funds to organizations after the dissolution of the Fund). It will be useful to specify the
designated entities in order to create something of an organized interest group that might
work to bring about the larger reparations plan.
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plan sketched here. One reason to pay organizations is that they will then be
more inclined to throw political weight behind the plan, but because payments
are to come out of individual rather than Congressional decision-making, there
67
is less need to build political support.
Organizations, and especially corporations, could play a much more
significant role where the burdens, rather than the benefits, are concerned. As
a sentimental matter, the most impressive reparations plan would probably be
one where many tens of millions of individuals signed an apology and pledged
to make payments to their African American compatriots. But in the real
world, where the overwhelming majority of White Americans feel no
responsibility for discrimination during World War II or for the discouraging
prospects of many African Americans of high school and college age, much
less for slavery, the path to success probably travels through the corporate
sector. Large corporations 68 might see voluntary reparations as good public
relations, and the wholesale participation of businesses might well impress a
significant segment of the population, especially African Americans who are
now understood as favoring reparations. 69 There will be room for cynicism, of
course, but the opt-in character of the plan is likely to do more for the
apologetic spirit of reparations than any legislation passed by a close vote (or,
more likely, not passed at all). The cynicism could be largely erased by
anonymity, as apologies will seem more meaningful if they are not part of an
61 On the other hand, organizations might be useful in enacting the pieces of legislation
necessary for the plan sketched here, and they might also serve to advertise or educate

individuals asked to contribute to the Reparations Fund described presently. In some part, I

choose the individual route because it is more interesting, and not because it is more likely
to succeed - though success remains the stated point of the exercise. There is also the
unstated point that organizations have weight because they have or can overcome collective
action problems and yet we should not assume that every organization has unexploited
power to spare.
68 1 do not mean to exclude partnerships and other entities, though the tax deduction will
often be worth more to corporations - and partners might prefer to contribute as individuals.
Similarly, foundations and other not-for-profit entities might help fund a reparations plan,

but donors to foundations will likely prefer the partial tax credit available for direct
contributions over the deduction normally associated with transfers to foundations.
Foundations with substantial endowments might, however, be an important source of
matching funds and other incentives that would be useful in encouraging individual
contributions to the Reparations Fund.
69 See supra note 10 (reporting survey data that indicates reasonably strong support for
reparation among African Americans). The idea here is that a majority might be disinclined
to support reparations, but a minority might be extremely well disposed. Firms that support

reparations might gain so much from this minority that it would be worth any minor
discomfort experienced by a larger number of customers or shareholders. In the longer run,
if the reparations plan succeeded in bettering race relations, ending race-based programs that
the majority liked even less, or bringing finality to the reparations issue, participation by a
firm would likely be seen as a very positive thing, even by persons who were initially
inclined to attach a negative image to firms that favored or engaged in reparative payments.

HeinOnline -- 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1307 2004

1308

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1291

advertising campaign that serves the corporation's interests. On the other
hand, those who most wish to hear an apology normally need to know who is
doing the apologizing, so that anonymity and apology do not normally go well
together. In the end, if more than half the Fortune 500 contribute significantly
to a reparations plan of the kind sketched in this article, the plan would likely
be regarded as enormously successful. Success can thus come by way of a
privatized reparations plan, through which individuals could also join in with
contributions of their own.
IV.

PRIVATIZATION AS A MEANS OF ATTRACTING MAJORITY SUPPORT

The central idea here is that a reparations scheme can be elective, of an optin or opt-out form,70 with some individuals and firms choosing to make
payments while others do not. The plan advanced here comes in two steps: (1)
enabling legislation that might well be supported by many citizens who do not
plan on making direct payments; followed by (2) a long period in which
volunteers choose individually the degree to which they will bear the burden of
reparations. If there are sufficient volunteers, the plan is likely to be successful
and last for a period of years determined, for the most part, by the presence or
absence of new, later volunteers.
Voluntarism is not nearly as startling on the beneficiary side. One reaction
to the suggestion that some African Americans might find reparations
distasteful 7' is the obvious response that such citizens, assuming they are in the
designated beneficiary class, can always decline to accept reparative payments.
Note, in passing, that this may be an advantage that attaches to a scheme that
avoids organizations and provides payments to individuals. But the power to
decline does not answer all objections. One who objects to reparations on
grounds of distasteful commodification might be satisfied by simple refusal.
On the other hand, an objection based on the possible taint recipients might
endure, or based on the risk that reparations (even if accompanied by some sort
of political or collective apology) might bring a period of remorse or education
to a close, will not be overcome by an individual's declining to receive a
reparative payment. It should be sufficient to note that other reparations plans
did come into existence even though there were surely some sensible and
principled persons who declined, or were even offended by, the offer of
reparations.
There is, however, good reason to think about the majority that is necessary
70

1 have focused on an opt-in illustration, but voluntariness could be of the reverse form

with an assessment on each individual and business based on income, wealth, or some other
feature, followed by an opportunity to opt-out of the plan. See Paul M. Schwartz, Property,
Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2055, 2100-07 (2004) (discussing the
differences between opt-in and opt-out schemes).
71 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 723-25 (commenting on possible objections
from the beneficiary class, based on a notion that reparations could be demeaning or
offensive).
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to enable payments, though not to make payments, for personal election rather

than majority vote is there required. Enabling legislation includes the
institution of a partial tax credit 72 (or at least the willingness to accept a tax
deduction for reparative payments 73), without which success seems impossible.
The promise to give credit in the event that mandatory reparations come into
being is less critical, but also significant. In a world in which only a very low
percentage of White Americans favors reparations, 74 how can one contemplate
sufficient support for the enabling legislation?
The question takes us to the heart of the way we publicly finance many
endeavors through tax deductions and credits. It is, as I have described
elsewhere, that taxes are ballots.

75

Most taxpayers would not vote for direct

government support for my law school (and indeed we get none), but they may

72

The main argument for the partial tax credit approach is that many taxpayers do not

receive any benefit from deductibility. This has been a recurring argument in favor of
converting some deductions into credits, or partial credits. See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, A
Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization of Built-In Gains, 56
TAX L. REv. 1, 35-38 (2002) (discussing the choice of deductions or credits). The argument
for the credit approach seems especially strong here because it makes recapturing much
simpler (in the event of future mandatory payments or if insufficient funds are raised at the
outset). Recapturing deductions is a much more difficult calculation for unsophisticated
taxpayers. Another argument for the credit approach is that while partial credits of this sort
are not unknown, see, for example, I.R.S. PUBLICATION 503: CHILD AND DEPENDENT CARE

EXPENSES (2003) (showing that the child-care credit can range from 20-35% of qualifying
child and dependent care expenses, depending on income), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p503.pdf, they are sufficiently unusual as to draw attention to the underlying scheme,
and education is surely part of the argument for a reparations plan. A full credit would,
however, weaken the taxes-as-ballots approach, because "voters" for reparations would
externalize the entire cost on other taxpayers. Finally, and most important, a failure to
provide any government subsidy or to match individual contributions is likely to doom the
plan.
13 The argument for deductibility (or an even stronger incentive) is fairly strong. Indeed,
a case can be made that no special legislation is required because the Reparations Fund
might easily qualify as a 501(c)(3) entity, entitled to tax-exempt status and enabling
qualifying donors to receive charitable deductions for their contributions. See I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) (2004).
On the other hand, however much the plan is apologetic and
redistributive, it is not limited to needy beneficiaries and they are not required to use the
reparative payments for educational needs. See id. § 170(c). Congress (or the Internal
Revenue Service) would probably be asked to enact explicit legislation in order to remove
any uncertainty about the status of the payments that are received, not to mention the
deductibility of those made. The credit approach would plainly require specific legislation.
14 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
71 See generally Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, supra note 49, at 387-89 (arguing that "the
tax system ... can be used to gauge preferences in a way that substitutes for, or even
improves upon, a function normally performed by the ballot box or by privately organized
surveys" and, consequently, "the tax system can be understood as allowing dispersed donors
to determine which agents, projects, or causes the government will finance").
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be willing and perhaps even eager to allow the government to match any
contribution I make to it. My willingness to give $1,000 - in the form of a
nominal $1,500 donation with the associated tax preference worth, say, $500 to
me, calls forth some taxpayer support because of the tax deduction for
qualified charitable giving. 76 Through this system, the government can be seen
as enlisting the help of its taxpayers in identifying good social investments.
Support of this kind can also be seen as the product of a political bargain
among parties who fail to agree on a direct government subsidy, but are able to
agree on indirect and partial support. One citizen, A, might be disinclined to
favor reparations (or payments to a law school, for that matter), but not
opposed to doing so if others bear the brunt of the cost. It may be that neither
A nor A's ancestors were directly involved in wronging the aggrieved class, or
perhaps A is uncomfortable with the weak connection between those who were
wronged and those would now benefit from reparations. If A's family were
part of the mass immigration pattern of the twentieth century, then this
connection might be made stronger by structuring African American
reparations as a response to employment or educational discrimination in the
1950s rather than to slavery in the 1850s. In either case, it is useful to limit the
characters and stereotypes and assert that virtually any reparations scheme
involving millions of people is likely to have a matching problem that causes
our hypothetical group of citizens, represented by A, to stand in opposition.
Alternatively, A's disinclination may be jurisprudential. A may be of the
view that legal remedies ought to offer finality or perhaps even reflect a
timeless moral theory, so that something held to be lawful after due
deliberation in the past should not now be regarded as grounds for guilt and
reparations. Such views, not to mention simple self-interest, might cause A, or
politicians who seek A's support, to vote against a reparations proposal. A
could be expected to abide by any law passed by a lawful majority, but
reparations schemes would come to pass only over A's objection. If citizens
like A enjoy a comfortable majority, or otherwise get their way in the
legislature and courts, then we will normally expect no large-scale reparations.
But, it is possible that A is willing to allow or even to facilitate reparative
payments to be made by other citizens, so long as A is unburdened. More
interestingly, A may be agreeable so long as A pays a relatively small share, or
need not be seen as favoring reparations or admitting responsibility for past
wrongs. For expositional purposes, let us imagine that A is simply lukewarm
to the idea of reparations and comfortable with such a remedy, or process of
social recovery, only if the cost is largely externalized. In particular, A will
regard reparations to African Americans as something that is to be supported

76 See I.R.C. § 170 (stating the general rule that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction

any charitable contribution... payment of which is made within the taxable year"). There is
also a form of matching inherent in the tax-free status of the Law School, so that it has no
income tax upon receipt of tuition and contributions, but this added complexity of benefit, if
it is indeed that, adds little to the story told here.
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only if it is part of a political bargain that gives A some things that A really
wants (as perhaps A did for the case of interned Japanese Americans, or for
survivors of ugly massacres that gained prominence after deferred historical
review 77). A thus regards reparations about the way most citizens view roadbuilding proposals in distant states; they like them better the more the cost of
construction falls on other taxpayers or on actual users, and they are more
willing to pay for them the more these roads are part of a political package in
which other taxpayers bear burdens associated with benefits that are enjoyed
closer to home.
In this vein, we might imagine B to be a voter who opposes reparations and
any government intermediation in favor of reparations. Perhaps B finds
reparations to be immoral or bad precedent or likely to foster wasteful rentseeking, as a variety of groups step forward to assert why they too ought to be
part of a reparations scheme that the government enables.
There is also likely to be C, an individual, firm, or large group of voters,
who very much favors reparative payments. C would vote in favor of almost
any plan that raised revenue to transfer to African Americans or some subset of
African Americans.
Two sorts of individuals, with opposing views, may ally with C. D favors
reparations, but not if they are voluntary. D may think it just or educational to
impose reparative payments, or D may find free-riding revolting. D wants the
government to pay reparations. In contrast, E favors reparations only if she
can pay them voluntarily. E may not want reparations to be terribly divisive,
and she thinks that a mandatory scheme will create more problems than it
solves. Many other sorts of individuals and groups are possible, and some
over- and under-inclusiveness is inevitable, but these representatives are
sufficient for present purposes.
The next step is to imagine that none of these individuals or groups has a
majority, but that a coalition, and perhaps even a stable majority coalition, can
be formed in a manner that overcomes B. This sort of coalition has not arisen
in actual experience, the argument goes, because of transaction costs and
something of a failure of imagination. But with some groundwork we can
envisage a reparations plan that appeals to A, and thus manages to gain
approval from a majority of voters, including A, C, and D or E.
The strategy conceived of here thus bears some resemblance to many notfor-profit organizations. The resemblance derives from the fact that a system
of optional payments is precisely what most charities offer. Much as a
university might announce a scholarship plan and ask donors to contribute to it,
and then ask students to attend the university and accept the scholarship
money, so too a reparations plan for African Americans, or a subset that can
trace its connection to a particular past wrong, can ask donors to make
77 See, e.g., Yamamoto, supra note 19, at 490 (referring to reparations paid six decades
after the 1923 Rosewood massacre to some 154 survivors and descendants and noting the
importance of features such as identifiability and likely finality).
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reparative payments and cannot, of course, force all intended beneficiaries to
accept payments. Put this way, privatized reparations will seem less like a
government program because most such programs use the power of the state
and of majority rule to force dissenting citizens to contribute to funding
programs, and more like conventional charities, which rely on voluntary
contributions, and then secondarily on government grants, tax deductions, and
tax-exemptions.
A reparations advocate will want to de-emphasize the apparent similarity
between privatized reparations and conventional philanthropy, if only because
intended beneficiaries may react with great hostility to a reparative plan that
smacks of charity. A plan that was palatable to A and also to a majority of
voters will not accomplish much if it irks intended recipients. These recipients
may be interested in something closer to a true apology, though that may never
be possible in intermediated form. In any event, charitable reparations, if I can
call them that, may give more offense than reconciliation.
It is arguable that the beneficiary class ought not or need not react
negatively to a plan that resembled charity. After all, even a straightforward
apology by a government, whether standing alone or accompanied by
reparations, is at best the product of a majority vote. An apology that is the
product of a 60-40 vote, or perhaps one that follows some bargaining over
other matters in order to produce a majority coalition, will inevitably provide
something of a strange taste. A true democracy may be incapable of the art of
deep and comforting apologies.
Two of the smaller novelties introduced here draw further attention to the
very thin line between charitable endeavors and direct, government programs.
I refer to the idea of returning contributions if a minimum amount is not raised
and to the notion of giving credit for past payments in the event that payments
become required by law. 78 The latter presents logistical difficulties, but the

71 The promise of a critical mass of contributors, or your money back, is central to the
privatization idea. If the trustees are good fundraisers, then they might secure pledges in
advance of a public phase of this reparations program in order to show that a critical mass of
contributors is already on board. Thus, if a website is deployed, or the Internal Revenue
Service can add a line to individual tax returns providing a check-off system for the
solicitation of pledges, it will be useful to provide filers or website visitors with information
about promises that have already been made. Ideally, those who choose to bear the burden
of reparations could make contingent pledges of the form "I pledge to increase my tax bill
by 10% in each of the next five years so long as one million or more other taxpayers do the
same." As pledges are made and publicized, more are to be expected. One can also imagine
the trustees or organizers' soliciting matching pledges in advance; C will be more likely to
contribute if C knows that her pledge brings on a matching government pledge of sorts,
because of the partial tax credit, and an additional matching amount in some ratio from a
foundation or set of philanthropists. C's $1,000 might in this way be "worth" $4,000 to the
Fund, and if C cares about the success of the reparations plan, then C will be more inclined
to contribute under these terms. An advantage of matching grants, rather than outright large
gifts, is that part of the success of privatized reparations comes from large-scale
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ideas have been included here in order to focus attention on a variety of
collective action problems. The first idea is simple and is probably unfamiliar
only because one cannot normally receive a tax deduction for a highly
contingent contribution. It is common, however, to give money in restricted
fashion, so that a donor may receive a tax deduction for money given for the
specific purpose of building a new hospital wing. 79 But if the hospital is ever
in the position where it is forced to return the money to the donor, the donor
must report income under the tax-benefit rule so as to refund to the government
that which the taxpayer gained by the earlier deduction. 80 The same would be
done here, whether deductions or partial credits are at issue. 81 In large part, the
promise to return money intended for reparations can be recharacterized as
restricting contributions to the Fund's two target groups, and forcing the return
of all money if the Fund is unable even to make the $20,000 payments to each
surviving African American veteran in the first group. The point is simply to
encourage volunteers, who may reason that the benefits of the reparations plan
82
depend on large-scale participation and payments.
The second promise, to give credit for voluntary payments should taxes or
other mandatory payments be required in the future, also aims to encourage
volunteers, who may otherwise fear that they will contribute now only to be
forced to pay once again in the future. 83 But this promise crosses the line from
participation, because without such opting-in the plan will seem less like a societal apology
and rectification, and more like a charitable endeavor that the overwhelming majority of the
population opposes or finds trivial.
71 See Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, supra note 49, at 420-21 (noting that donors often
restrict donations to be used for specific purposes).
80 See I.R.C. § 111 (2003).
81 The tax-benefit idea is complicated. Imagine a taxpayer who expects to earn $200,000
a year, and expects tax rates of 40%. The taxpayer pledges to the Reparations Fund a 10%
surtax for five years, and a 50% credit makes this the equivalent of a 45% tax rate rather
than a 50% rate. After several years of such payments and credits, a mandatory reparations
scheme is legislated, and it is estimated to require a 1% hike in the income tax. Note that
this is a conservative estimate, as federal individual income taxes (excluding Social
Insurance and Retirement Receipts) totaled $794 billion in 2003. See OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 2005: HISTORICAL TABLES § 2,

at 30 (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/pdf/hist.pdf. In
any event, our taxpayer has been promised credit, but is this a credit for the $20,000 per year
nominally paid, for the $10,000 per year post-credit cost, for one of those amounts plus the
time value of money, or for some amount that depends on the projected payments this
taxpayer would be required to make under the new scheme and at the taxpayer's current
income level? The simplest and also most reasonable answer is probably a $10,000 nonrefundable credit that can be carried forward.
82 See Ogletree, supra note 5, at 284 (expressing the need for all Americans to participate
in reparative programs to effectively "eradicate racism" and "to work toward correcting the
chronic fragmentation along racial lines that exists in so much of our country today").
83 Skeptics will have already noticed that the promise to give credit for voluntary
payments, in the event that mandatory payments are later legislated, is worth only as much
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as a later government chooses. A promise not to raise taxes, whether made by a Congress or
by a candidate for President, is easily broken later on, and, indeed, changed circumstances
may make it foolish to keep earlier promises. Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82
VA. L. REV. 567, 624-27 (1996) (commenting on the difficulty of designing enforceable
precommitments). The same can be said about promises to end or continue affirmative
action. It is impossible to bind a distant Congress or Court. A government would need to
work very hard indeed to influence future governments - or to provoke later courts to
declare that something was unconstitutionally retroactive, which is to say impermissible or
legal only if accompanied by just compensation (which would defeat the point of the tax or
other charge). Still, promises are worth something because there is a political cost to
breaking them. See id.
Another problem is that a mandatory reparations plan may come about without a clear
plan as to who bears the financial burden. If, for example, the government simply borrows
to pay reparations, it will be hard to say who is paying the freight. Earlier contributors
could receive the credit as soon as a reparations plan is announced, on grounds that the
money must come from somewhere. It might therefore be presumed to come from general
tax revenues, but this is likely to over-stimulate these voluntary contributors into pushing for
a government-sponsored (non-privatized) reparations plan. By way of further illustration,
imagine a reparations plan that was to be paid for by an excise tax or a special corporate tax
on businesses or products thought to have benefited most from past discriminatory policies.
With such a plan legislated, it would seem inappropriate to give the credit for earlier
payments. A promise to reimburse earlier payments (in credit or other form) regardless of
the form of the public reparations program thus seems unwise; earlier volunteers might
affirmatively pay (or lobby extensively) for such a reparations program in order to get a
program through at someone else's expense and receive their money back.
There is, of course, another means to guard against the problem of putative volunteers
holding back because they fear that payments will be required of them in the future. It is to
promise that there will be no future reparations plan. For better or worse, such a promise
may simply not be credible. See id. Reparations could be required by a court after a lawsuit
is brought against the government or against a large class of individuals or businesses, and
the anxious taxpayer will fear that he or she faces double payments. It seems likely that if
there were a method of guaranteeing that a proposed reparations or affirmative action would
expire on a given date and never be followed by another such plan, then many more citizens
would favor these plans - and perhaps more generous versions of them. The real question,
therefore, is whether the promise to give credit to earlier volunteers (in the event that a
mandatory plan is later enacted) is more credible than the promise not to entertain any future
reparations plan. My affirmative answer to this question is based on the observation that
while it is easy to imagine substantial political pressure in favor of reparations - be they
additional or directed to a group that did not receive reparative payments under the plan
described here - it is very difficult to imagine that passions or politics will call for breaking
an earlier promise to give credit for payments voluntarily made. Common sense, political
reputations, and moral intuitions will support keeping that promise, and there will be no
strong interest group or social pressure to break it. In contrast, a promise to pay no further
reparations might easily run up against the will to do more or to pay persons who have not
yet recovered, much as the question of German reparations have been re-opened half a
century after earlier reparations were paid, and much as claims about Indian lands were
advanced long after the Indian Claims Act of 1946. See Levmore, Changes, supra note 3, at
1693-96 (admitting that many past reparations programs have failed to achieve finality).
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taxpayer-government partnership to the creation of an interest group with
something of an investment to protect. The critical point is that the promise to
protect contributors against double payment, so to speak, will transform many
of these contributors into unusually strong proponents of future, mandatory
reparations. What looks like a safety clause, to induce contributions from
those who hesitate because they do not want to run the risk of paying twice,
creates a group of voters who can be expected to seek to force reparations
payments on less enthusiastic donors through a mandatory plan in the future.
This mandatory plan will be costless to the first group because of the provision
which treats their earlier "voluntary" payments as down payments against any
future taxes or other required payments. To be sure, some volunteers will
surely vote against a later, mandatory plan, perhaps because they value free
choice, because they think sufficient reparations will be paid without a taxbased system, because they might, in self-interested fashion, fear that
mandatory reparations will open the door for other tax-supported plans that
they do not support, or even because they receive pleasure from having
participated in a successful voluntary plan. But many, if not most, of the
volunteers can be expected to favor reparations and, thus, the extension of
reparative payments to many years of high school graduates, especially, if this
can be done at no cost to them. They will, in essence be in a position to vote
for the complete externalization of costs. This group, joined by those who
hope to receive reparations, will need to find coalition partners, but the point is
simply that a voluntary plan can make a compulsory plan more likely.
The same is not true for most taxpayer-government partnerships,
accomplished through deductions and credits. 84 Donors to the American Red
Cross secure government financing, or partnership, through the tax deductions
they receive. They are also more likely than most citizens to vote for direct
government payments to that organization or to the very program the Red
Cross undertakes. They have, after all, revealed themselves to be persons who
have great faith in the Red Cross, and so they are more likely than most to
think that government support for the Red Cross is wise. They would be even
more likely to favor direct support if somehow the government's direct
payments to the Red Cross came from taxes on other citizens, but this is likely
to be a marginal consideration. Indeed, a well run fundraising campaign by the
American Red Cross is likely to convert direct government support into more
private commitments of support, much as universities that receive the most
direct government support are also, by and large, those that receive the most
private support.
The cases that come closer to our promise of future credit for past payment
are those where private investment makes further expenditures worthwhile.
Consider, for example, private developers who build roads and develop new
residential communities, or early railroad companies that built lines to new
14See Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, supra note 49, at 404-08 (discussing the functions of
deductions and credits in taxpayer-government partnerships).
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frontiers. With these investments in place, further expenditures are likely to be
profit maximizing, which is to say not a product of a sunk cost fallacy. For
example, the railroad may have found it worthwhile to invest in public safety
in a frontier town because stability and trade generated profits for the railroad.
But, of course, it may have been more profitable still to exert political pressure
on the government to send troops to the town, because costs could be shifted to
taxpayers at large. The overall picture is one in which private enterprise and
voluntary systems can easily lead to public intervention and costs later on.
Government policies reflect just such calculations when citizens are forbidden
to travel to certain countries. Voluntary private activity can lead inexorably to
costly government intervention later on, and the best way to avoid these costs
may be to ban the private activity in the first time period. But we rarely
consider this public choice problem, if it is that, in the case of domestic private
enterprise and charitable endeavors.
My claim here is not that we should oppose privatized reparations because
they will lead to standard (and more costly) reparations in the future, but rather
that we can take this example of privatization as a window through which to
see this new area of inquiry. In future work I plan to explore further this
question of private enterprise and the creation of interest groups, or the path
dependence of government activity. For now, I am pleased if readers share this
sense that one period's private enterprise, so easy to celebrate, may be next
period's public responsibility. The accompanying and difficult question is
whether it is possible to know when it is sensible to place burdens in front of
the first period's entrepreneurs, or even possible to secure promises of private,
rather than public, financing for the investments that will be called for in the
later period.
V.

SUMMARY

A reader who has come this far has seen enough to understand the present
exercise. It is to design a reparations scheme, focused on the African
American experience, with some chance of enactment and success. Political
experience, history, financial realities, and even survey data suggest that
straightforward reparations to all African Americans are quite unlikely. This
may be especially true because of the uncertain future of affirmative action. I
have avoided describing reparations as a substitute for affirmative action,
though it ought to be noted how different they would be. Voluntary payments
fund the reparations described here, while affirmative action's burdens fall
squarely on involuntary losers, be they applicants or co-workers. Insofar as a
more conventional reparations scheme is concerned, the absence of clear
answers to the questions of who would pay, how much they would pay, and
who would receive transfers, has made it difficult to get most people to take
seriously the design of a reparations program. Concrete proposals to pay all
African Americans who can trace their way up a family tree to a slave or, in
much more recent times, to someone who suffered unrecompensed
discrimination in education or employment, creates an enormous set of
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beneficiaries and then seems to raise the objection that many, if not most,
taxpayers bear little direct responsibility for those particular wrongs.
Moreover, groups that bear more responsibility would escape making
payments and other groups deserving reparations would not receive them. The
strategy undertaken here has been to pick two very different beneficiary
groups, one of the "right" age and one more forward looking, and to use
voluntary contributors, assisted by government promises and tax credits in the
manner of many tax favored programs that would never garner majority
support.
The plan is private in some ways and public in others. The reparations are
privatized in the sense that taxpayers choose whether to make direct
contributions. But, the plan still requires government involvement if there is to
be a partial tax credit (or other inducement), if pledges can be collected
through the income tax system, if the income to the beneficiaries is to be tax
free though it not be in the form of scholarships, 85 and if there is to be a
credible promise of credit for voluntary payments in the event that the future
brings a system of publicly-financed reparations. This is a formidable list, and
so much so that the title of this article is a bit misleading. But the opt-in, or
self-assessed, 86 character of the reparations payments is sufficiently novel and
certainly unlike anything found in previous reparations plans as to deserve
special attention.
The private part of this reparations plan brings to mind features of our
campaign finance system, because its ability to fund campaigns and
conventions also depends on individual decision making. 87 The private
pledges will entirely determine the life of the reparative payments to the
second group of beneficiaries.
Somewhat similarly, private donors and
taxpayers (who can check the boxes) largely determine the amount of money
available to those who campaign for certain public offices. 88 In the reparations
plan, however, the amount of the private contribution is entirely in the hands of
85 If the money received is not in scholarship form and is not to compensate for personal
injuries, then it is arguably subject to the income tax - unless legislation provides otherwise.
See I.R.C. § 61 (2003) (defining gross income broadly as "all income from whatever source
derived").
86 The burdens need not be self-assessed, for the trustees could name an amount and
citizens could then decide whether to pledge that amount or not. But there seems to be
every reason to prefer self-assessments by individuals and corporations. It may be a good
fund-raising technique to establish a minimum pledge, unless revenue-raising is subsidiary
to the amalgamation of a large number of persons who can be said to agree to an apology
and the principle of reparations.
87 The amounts paid to finance presidential campaigns and conventions are set by statute,
but individual check-off decisions determine the availability of those funds. See 26 U.S.C. §
9006 (2000). Admittedly, Congress can and has modified the amount of check-off
contributions based on taxpayer response. Congress might also be expected to change the
amount of payment if the revenues from this source changed considerably.
88 See id. § 9006(c).
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each contributor.
Although the above design exercise has tried to show that a quasi-voluntary
reparations plan is conceivable, though perhaps just barely so, my larger aim
has been to advance a variety of public choice questions. One is whether other
opportunities exist to take private and diverse intensities of preferences into
account, even though free-rider problems make it very difficult to assess these
preferences.
Much of what our governments do reflects the intense
preferences of a minority of the citizenry, and this is especially so once we take
government support in the form of tax preferences into account. Here, the
question has been whether we can (or ought not to) expand this set yet further.
If the reparations plan sketched here were to succeed, it would surely be an
interesting springboard for other experiments in public choice, particularly
where a significant minority has intense, but repeatedly unfulfilled preferences.
Finally, I have sought to raise the question of how private enterprise often
begets public activity through the creation of interest groups and pathdependent investment opportunities. This is a topic for future inquiry.
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